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Abstract 
This paper attempts to identify implicit exchange rate regimes for currencies of 
the Central and Eastern European Countries vis-à-vis the euro. To that end, we apply a 
sequential procedure that considers the dynamics of exchange rates to data covering the 
period from 1977:01 to 2006:02. Our results would suggest that implicit bands have 
existed in many subperiods for almost all currencies under study. Once we detect de 
facto discrepancies between de facto and de iure exchange rate regimes, we propose a 
model in order to explain these decisions. Our results suggest a positive association 
between the previous inflation rate and the probability of a peg with the euro, and a 
negative association with past unemployment rate.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2004, ten new Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) became 
European Union (EU) member states. Although this did not imply immediate 
membership in European and Monetary Union (EMU), after a two-year derogation 
period, their convergence has been evaluated on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty. But, 
in contrast to the past experiences of United Kingdom and Denmark, the CEECs are not 
granted with opt-out clauses in joining the EMU. In other words, the way toward the 
adoption of the euro is a non-return one for these new members. 
 
Among the four convergence criteria (i.e., price stability, sustainable fiscal 
position, exchange rate stability and low interest rates) has been used in evaluating the 
catching-up process of these economies, the exchange rate stability  is perhaps the most 
striking one, given the crucial role that exchange regime plays in determining 
macroeconomic stability and investment climate. 
 
When joining the EU, the currencies of the CEECs exhibited a rather 
heterogeneous pattern in their exchange rate movements against the euro. This was due 
not only to the fact that the macroeconomic developments and degree of success in 
maintaining stability are very different from one country to the next but also, in 
particular, to the broad range of exchange rate regimes currently being applied in the 
new member states.  
 
Since the assessment of exchange rate stability includes as a mandatory the 
participation for at least two years in the new European Monetary System (EMS) 
linking the currencies of non-euro area, most of the CEECs were expected to join it. In 
fact, over the past years the euro has increasingly gained importance as the main 
reference currency in both the pegged and managed regimes prevailing in the CEECs. 
 
 Nevertheless, the de facto exchange rate policy adopted by monetary authorities 
has tended to differ from the announced de jure exchange rate regime, which is why 
IMF classifications are not always a good guide to the true exchange rate intentions of 
said authorities. 
 
 The new literature in this area seeks to achieve two linked objectives, namely, to 
detect divergences between de jure and de facto regimes and to assess the consequences 
of these differences on the relevance of exchange rates for macroeconomic 
performance1. Recognition of the divergences opens up a number of key questions 
regarding the analysis and recommendations of international economic organizations as 
well as for academic work: which is the correct classification and which variables and 
methods should be considered for this purpose? 
 
 Recently, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) have presented a comprehensive 
classification of the exchange rate regimes of 153 countries over the last half-century. 
Their research suggests the importance of de facto bands in the international economy. 
Other approaches focus on the variation of central bank reserves and acknowledge the 
                                                 
1 See Coudert and Dubert (2004) for a survey of studies on implicit exchange rate regimes. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) examine the relevance of the exchange rate regime classifications for empirical 
macroeconomics.  
relevance of intervention in detecting implicit pegs and bands (see, for instance, 
Poirson, 2001). 
 
 
This paper has two main objectives. The first purpose of the paper is to use a 
sequential procedure that considers the dynamics of exchange rates to detect implicit 
bands for the exchange rate between the CEECs’ currencies and the euro. The second 
aim is to study the reasons behind the implicit bands detected in the CEECs. 
 
 The paper is organized as follows. To place the study in its proper context, 
Section 2 presents a brief background of the CEEC’s exchange rate regimes before and 
after EU accession, with special emphasis in the requirement of ERM-II participation 
before adopting the euro. In Section 3, we apply a statistical procedure to detect implicit 
bands to data for the CEECs covering the 1977-2006 period. In section 4 we address the 
economic factors explaining the implicit bands detected by estimating a logit model 
based on the Barro-Gordon model. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
  
2. The CEEC’s and the euro 
 
As previously mentioned, on 1 May 2004 ten new member states (Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) joined the EU. Two years and eight months later, on 1 January 2007, the EU 
welcomed Bulgaria and Romania.  
 
It was expected that the new countries would adopt the euro only when they 
fulfil the same economic criteria demanded for the current euro area members. To that 
end, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been preparing convergence reports in 
which it analyses whether the countries have achieved a high degree of sustainable 
economic convergence for adoption of the euro. This is assessed on the basis of the 
fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria. One of such criteria is the observance 
of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the new, modified Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (the so-called ERM-II) of the EMS, linking the currencies of non-euro area.  
 
The ERM-II is a pegged but adjustable system in which central parities are 
defined against the euro and not between all other participating currencies. Hence, this 
bilateral nature, in contrast to the multilateral one of its predecessor the ERM, is 
expected to reduce the frequency and the scope of interventions. Central rates and 
fluctuation bands are set by common agreement involving the ministers of the euro area, 
the ECB and National Central Bank (NCB) governors of the non-euro area member 
state. 
 
The standard fluctuation band is ±15%, while not excluding the possibility of 
setting a narrower band. Intervention support of the ECB to the NCB is automatic at the 
margins of the band (marginal interventions), but any interventions within the band 
(intra-marginal interventions) need not be (but may be) supported by the ECB. Finally, 
realignments of central parity are made by the common procedure, which both the ECB 
and the member states have the right to initiate. 
 
As any other fixed regime the ERM-II was expected to play a stabilizing role in 
CEEC’s economies, since the maintenance of the pre-committed rate should be taken 
into account in the design of economic policies. First of all, ERM-II would contribute to 
get exchange rate steadiness. “Its stabilizing role should derive from the announcement 
of the central parity, which should provide the markets with a lead and thereby reduce 
exchange rate fluctuations” (Czech National Bank, 2003, p. 5). This role must be 
enhanced by the ECB’s intervention assistance, though in principle such support is only 
planned at the margins. Moreover, arguments in favour of the ERM-II highlight its 
function in disciplining national authorities to pursue consistent macroeconomic 
policies. In particular, past experiences show the importance of price stability and 
sustainable public finances for maintaining a credible fixed regime. 
 
However a carefully revision of recent episodes should warn us about some 
potential problems associated with the participation in a system like the ERM-II. With 
limited exchange rate flexibility and an environment of increasing capital mobility, the 
large capital inflows that will be directed towards these economies (mainly in the form 
of foreign direct investment) are expected to exert appreciating pressures on domestic 
currencies. Alarmingly, large capital inflows figured in virtually every financial crisis of 
the 1990s. Other features that characterized recent crises, and that are still present in 
accession economies, are the basic development of their financial systems, limiting to a 
great extent the managing of interest rates as a defensive device, and the higher levels of 
inflation, pushing up real exchange rates and increasing the probability of future 
realignments be needed. Finally some credibility problems may arise from the fact that 
central parities are subject to realignment: in the case of such transition economies 
involved in a catching-up process the credibility of the central rate may be eroded over 
time.  
 
These and other potential gains and shortcomings could have not gone unnoticed 
for some of the CEECs and could have significantly affected their decision to follow or 
not de facto or de iure implicit bands, maintaining the exchange rate around a central 
parity.  
 
When joining the EU, the currencies of the CEECs exhibited a rather 
heterogeneous pattern in their exchange rate movements against the euro: Estonia and 
Lithuania had a currency board pegged to the euro, Cyprus and Hungary unilaterally 
shadow ERM-II, Slovenia pegged its currency to the euro within a crawling band; 
Maltese lira was pegged to a currency basket dominated by the euro; Latvia pegged its 
currency to the International Monetary Fund’s special drawing right; and Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia pursued a floating exchange rate regime. 
 
On 27 June 2004, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia joined the ERM-II. The 
central rates were set, respectively at EKK 15.6466, SIT 239.640 and LTL 3.45280 per 
euro. On 29 April 2005, the currencies of Cyprus, Latvia and Malta joined the ERM II, 
being set the central rates at CYP 0.585274, LVL 0.702804 and MTL 0.429300 per 
euro. On 25 November 2005, the Slovak koruna joined the ERM-II, with a central rate 
of SKK 38.4550 koruna per euro. In all cases, the standard fluctuation band of ±15% 
around the central rate was set.  
 
Slovenia introduced the European single currency on 1 January 2007, being 
the13th member of the euro area. Cyprus and Malta both plan to introduce the euro on 1 
January 2008, while the Slovak Republic intends to do so one year later, on 1 January 
2009.  
 
3. Implicit bands 
 
In this section we implement two methods leading to the detection of implicit 
bands for the CEEC’s exchange rates. On the one hand, the descriptive procedure used by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), and on the other hand a variant in which we incorporate 
statistical significance to find de facto bands. 
 
Firstly, the procedure by Reinhart and Rogoff accepts the existence of a de facto 
pegged system if, during at least four consecutive months, no variation is seen in the 
exchange rate. They then calculate the probability that the monthly variation remained 
within ±1% or ±2% over a rolling 2-year period. If the probability is at least 80%, the 
regime is labelled a de facto peg (band) or crawling peg (band) in the case of a ±1% (±2%) 
margin, during said years. If a positive drift is observed, it is identified as a crawling peg or 
band while if the rate undergoes periods of both appreciation and depreciation it is deemed 
to be a moving peg or band. 
 
We have applied this procedure to the CEECs’ exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro 
for Cyprus (1977:04-2006:02), the Czech Republic (1994:12-2004:02), Estonia 
(1994:05-2006:02), Hungary (1977:04-2006:02), Latvia (1994:01-2006:02), Lithuania 
(1993:12-2006:02), Malta (1977:04-2006:02), Poland (1980:11-2006:02), Slovakia 
(1994:12-2006:02) and Slovenia (1993:11-2006:02). The source of data used is the IMF 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund and data 
availability determines the sample period examined for each country. 
 
Figures 1 to 10 give the results obtained by calculating the monthly proportion 
of the 24 previous months during which the percentage monthly variation in the 
exchange rate is less than ±1%. When the blue series (proportion within band) is above 
the red one (threshold) the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which would suggest the 
presence of fluctuation bands. This occurs for the 1995:02-1996:09 subperiod for the 
1977:07-1978:05 and 1994:05-2006:02 subperiods for the Cyprus pound (representing 
the 44 per cent of the sample); for the Czech koruna (20 per cent of the sample); for the 
1994:12-2006:02 subperiod for the Estonian kroon (95 per cent of the sample); for the 
2000:12-2001:06 subperiod for the Hungarian forint (2 per cent of the sample); for the 
2005:10-2006:02 subperiod for the Lithuanian lita (3 per cent of the sample); and for 
the 1978:06-1979:08, 1994:08-1995:03, 2000:03 and 2004:06-2006:02 subperiods for 
the Maltese lira (13 per cent of the sample). Note that we do not find evidence of 
implicit bands in any subperiod for the Latvian lat, the Polish zloty, the Slovenian tolar 
and the Slovak koruna. 
[Figures 1 to 10, here] 
The same procedure is followed in Figures 11 to 20, although here a fluctuation 
band of ±2% is considered. Once again, if the blue series (proportion within band) is 
above the red one (threshold) there is evidence of monthly limits of ±2% during a given 
subperiod. This occurs for the 1994:12-1996:12, 2000:12-2002:06, 2005:06-2005:10 
and 2005:12-2006:02 subperiods for the 1977:04-1979:11, 1982:03-1986:08 and 
1988:02-2006:02 subperiods for the Cyprus pound (representing the 87 per cent of the 
sample); for the Czech koruna (52 per cent of the sample); for the 1994:05-2006:02 
subperiod for the Estonian kroon (100 per cent of the sample); for the 1997:10-1978:01, 
1978:03, 1997:01-1998:12, 1999:09-2002:12 and 2003:04-2004:01 subperiods for the 
Hungarian forint (23 per cent of the sample); for the 1995:06-1997:05, 1997:08-2000:04 
and 2005:08-2006:02 subperiods for the Latvian lat (44 per cent of the sample); for the 
2002:11-2006:02 subperiod for the Lithuanian lita (27 per cent of the sample); for the 
1977:04-1980:03, 1980:09-1980:12, 1983:01-1984:03, 1984:05-1985:01, 1985:06 and 
1987:02-2006:02 subperiods for the Maltese lira (85 per cent of the sample); for the 
1997:01-1997:09 subperiod the Polish zloty (3 per cent of the sample); for the 1995:05-
1998:06 subperiod for the Slovenian tolar (26 per cent of the sample); and for the 
1995:05-1998:09, 2000:09-2002:08, 2002:11-2003:12 and 2004:04-2006:02 for the 
Slovak koruna (78 per cent of the sample). 
 
[Figure 11 to 20, here] 
 
  Secondly, we recognize one of the weaknesses of the approach taken by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004): the results are not filtered by their statistical significance.  
So we test  whether the average of the proportional absolute monthly variations for each 
rolling 24-month period is significantly less than ±1% or ±2%. To test if the population 
mean (of the monthly variations during 24-month periods) is less than or equal to a 
given mean 0  (±1% or ±2%) the following expression may be used:  
              
01
00
:
:




H
H
, where 0 is the given mean. 
 
The acceptance region of the null hypothesis is x , where x is the sample 
mean of a the exchange rate of a given currency vis-à-vis the euro and 
n
t n

  1,1  , where 1,1  nt   is the critical value of the t-Student distribution at a 
confidence level of 1 ,   is the serial population deviation and n  is the sample size. 
At a 5% confidence level we choose a critical value of 1.71. 
 
The results of the application of this statistical procedure, which avoids the need 
to count the periods previously, as Reinhart and Rogoff do, are given in Figures 21 to 
30 when ±1% fluctuation bands are considered. The average value (24 months rolling) 
of absolute proportional variations of the exchange rate of each month with respect to 
the previous month is given in blue, while the critical region appears in red. Thus, when 
the red series is above the blue one the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, which would 
suggest the existence of implicit fluctuation bands. This occurs for the 1977:04-
1980:12, 1981:11-1986:10, 1987:09 and 1988:02-2006:02 subperiods for the Cyprus 
pound (representing the 93 per cent of the sample); for the 1994:12-1996:12, 2000:08-
2002:06, 2002:09-2002:11, 2003:02-2003:03 and 2005:04-2006:02 subperiods for the 
Czech koruna (65 per cent of the sample); for the 1994:05-2006:02 subperiod for the 
Estonian kroon (100 per cent of the sample); for the 1977:08-1978:03, 1994:05, 
1994:07, 1994:09, 1997:01-2004:02 and 2006:01-2006:02 subperiods for the Hungarian 
forint (29 per cent of the sample); for the 1995:02-1997:03, 1997:05-1997:06, 1999:05-
1999:09, 2002:10-2003:08, 2005:04-2006:02 subperiods for the Latvian lat (38 per cent 
of the sample); for the 2002:10-2006:02 subperiod for the Lithuanian lita (28 per cent of 
the sample); for the 1977:04-1981:03, 1982:10, 1982:12-1990:01, 1990:06--2006:02 
subperiods for the Maltese lira (93 per cent of the sample); for the 1983:11, 1996:12-
1998:07 subperiods for the Polish zloty (7 per cent of the sample), for the 1995:02-
1998:04 and 1999:03-1999:07 subperiods for the Slovenian tolar (30 per cent of the 
sample); and for the 1994:12-1999:01, 2000:11-2001:12, 2002:03-2002:08 and 
2003:05-2006:02 subperiods for the Slovak koruna (77 per cent of the sample). 
 
 
[Figures 21 to 30, here] 
 
Figures 31 to 40 offer the results when a ±2% fluctuation band is used. As can 
be seen, the average of the monthly variations generally lies below the critical region in 
the following cases: during the 197704-2006:02 subperiod for the Cyprus pound 
(representing the 100 per cent of the sample); during the 1994:12-1996:12 and 1999:12-
2006:02 subperiods for the Czech koruna (100 per cent of the sample); during the 
1994:05-2006:02 subperiod for the Estonian kroon (100 per cent of the sample); during 
the 1997:01-1980:02, 1980:10-1981:03, 1982:02-1982:04 and 1983:03-2006:02 
subperiods for the Hungarian forint (92 per cent of the sample); during the 1995:06-
1997:05, 1997:08-2000:04 and 2005:08-2006:02 subperiods for the Latvian lat (44 per 
cent of the sample); during the 1995:05-2000:11, 2001:01-2001:07, 2001:09-2006:02 
subperiods for the Lithuanian lita (87 per cent of the sample); during the 1977:04-
2006:02 subperiod for the Maltese lira (100 per cent of the sample); during the 1982:12-
1985:02, 1991:10-1992:10 and 1993:02-2006:02 subperiods the Polish zloty (64 per 
cent of the sample); during the 1993:11-2002:02 and 2001:09-2006:02 subperiods for 
the Slovenian tolar (96 per cent of the sample); and during the 1994:12-2006:02 period 
for the Slovak koruna (100 per cent of the sample). 
 
 [Figures 31 to 40, here] 
Combining the results obtained from Figures 31 to 40 with that observed with 
the ±1% bands (Figures 21 to 30), we can be confident that fluctuation bands between 
±1% and ±2% existed throughout many subperiods, except during those subperiods 
detected with the ±1% test, when the bands were narrower. 
 
 
4. Explaining implicit bands 
 
In this section we explore the main determinants of the election of an exchange-
rate regime, making use of the well-known Barro-Gordon model. According to Barro 
and Gordon (1983), a monetary authority determines the inflation rate which maximises 
a social objective function in inflation and unemployment. The economy is represented 
by a simple Phillips curve: 
( )n eu u a        
where u denotes observed unemployment rate, nu  the natural rate of unemployment, 
 observed inflation, e expected inflation and   is a stochastic disturbance in output. 
As can be seen, only inflation surprises can affect unemployment, being a  the elasticity 
of unemployment to inflation surprises.   The loss function of the central bank is as 
follows: 
* 2 * 2( ) ( )L b u u      
where * denotes targeted inflation, *u is targeted unemployment rate and b  is the 
weight attached by central bank to stabilising the unemployment rate around the target.  
  
Assuming that target inflation is zero *( 0)  and that the central bank targets 
an unemployment rate below the natural rate )10,( *   nuu , combining these 
two equations we obtain: 
2 2[ ( ) (1 ) ]e nL b a u           
Minimizing L  with respect to , assuming rational expectations and solving for e , we 
obtain 
(1 )e nab u    
which states that, in equilibrium, the average inflation is positive, thus reflecting an 
inflation bias.  
 
Since economic agents will realize that governments have an incentive to cheat, 
they will take this into account. A policy such as the zero inflation policy in this model 
is said to be time inconsistent (i. e., the nature of the system is such that governments 
have an incentive to do something other than what they promised). Nevertheless, in a 
dynamic model in which the game between government and economic agents is played 
over and over again, governments can improve the situation by building up a reputation 
for keeping the inflation rate low. In this sense, Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) have 
shown that, by tying their hands of central banks of the countries participating in the 
ERM-II could have reached a certain degree of credibility for their monetary policies 
due to the discipline effect.  
 
From this perspective, we could interpret the detected implicit bands as a form 
of pre-commitment about macroeconomic policy made by the CEEC’s Central Banks to 
borrow the ECB's anti-inflation reputation. To test this hypothesis, we estimate a logit 
model, assuming that peg is a binary dependent variable, taking on values of one when 
we obtain peg in the variant of the Reinhart and Rogoff method.  
 
We model the probability of observing a value of one as:  
    tttt xFxpegPP  ,1 , being tx  a row vector of explanatory variables, 
T,..,t 1  where T is the sample period and where F is a continuous, strictly increasing 
function that takes a real value and returns a value ranging from zero to one. We assume 
that F is logistic, then probability is written as 2t3ttβx
βx
t xβxβββx    ;
e
e
P
'
t
'
t


 121
1
, 
where 2,1, jx jt  are past national inflation and unemployment rates, both computed as 
the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-four months in accordance with our 
methods of computing the implicit bands. The parameters in the logit equation are 
estimated by maximising the logarithm of the likelihood function: 
   
1 1
log ( ) (1 ) log 1 ( )  
T T
t t t t
t t
LogL peg F x peg F x  
 
      .2  
                                                 
2 We use quasi-maximum likelihood (Huber/White) to estimate the standard errors. Although these 
standard errors are not robust to heteroskedasticity in binary dependent variable models, they are robust to 
certain misspecifications of the underlying distribution of the peg. In addition, we use quadratic hill-
climbing to obtain parameter estimates. This algorithm uses the matrix of analytic second derivatives of 
[Tables 1 to 7, here] 
 
In Tables 1 to 7, we report the estimation results for those CEECs for which data 
are available, including the LR statistic to test the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero and the McFadden R-squared that is calculated 
by using the likelihood ratio index. As can be seen, the fundamental variables are 
statistically significant at the usual levels. On the one hand, the results suggest that an 
increase in the average inflation rate during the previous two years will increase the 
probability of a peg with the ECB. This in turn is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
NCBs has been trying to profit from the ECB’s reputation in order to achieve a lower 
inflation rate during the subperiods of the detected implicit bands. On the other hand, an 
increase in the average unemployment rate during the same period seems to 
significantly reduce the probability of a peg. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This study has explored the possible existence of implicit bands in the exchange 
rates of the currencies of the Central and Eastern European Countries vis-à-vis the euro. 
To this end, we have used both the classification procedure suggested by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) and a modification proposed in this paper to account for the statistical 
significance of the outcome of their classifying algorithm.  
 
The results obtained using both procedures indicate that the presence of bands in 
most of the currencies for several subperiods, including even before some of these 
countries joined the new ERM-II.  
 
Since the detected implicit bands could be interpreted as an attempt by the 
National Central Banks to borrow ECB's anti-inflation reputation, we estimate a logit 
model, based in the Barro-Gordon model. The results suggest a positive association 
between the previous inflation rate and the probability of a peg with the euro, and a 
negative association with past unemployment rate.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
the log likelihood in forming iteration updates and in computing the estimated covariance matrix of the 
coefficients. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of monthly variations in the Cyprus 
pound. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 2: Proportion of monthly variations in the Czech 
koruna. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 3: Proportion of monthly variations in the Estonian 
kroon. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 4: Proportion of monthly variations in the 
Hungarian forint. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 5: Proportion of monthly variations in the Latvian 
lat. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 6: Proportion of monthly variations in the 
Lithuanian lita. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 7: Proportion of monthly variations in the Maltese 
lira. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 8: Proportion of monthly variations in the Polish 
zloty. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 9: Proportion of monthly variations in the Slovak 
koruna. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 10: Proportion of monthly variations in the 
Slovenian tolar. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 11: Proportion of monthly variations in the Cyprus 
pound. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 12: Proportion of monthly variations in the Czech 
koruna. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 13: Proportion of monthly variations in the Estonian 
kroon. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 14: Proportion of monthly variations in the 
Hungarian forint. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 15: Proportion of monthly variations in the Latvian 
lat. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 16: Proportion of monthly variations in the 
Lithuanian lita. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 17: Proportion of monthly variations in the Maltese 
lira. Bands of ±2% 
0.64
0.68
0.72
0.76
0.80
0.84
0.88
0.92
0.96
1.00
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Proportion within band (2%) Threshold
 
Figure 18: Proportion of monthly variations in the Polish 
zloty. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 19: Proportion of monthly variations in the Slovak 
koruna. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 20: Proportion of monthly variations in the 
Slovenian tolar. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 21: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Cyprus pound. Bands of ±1% 
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Average variations Critical region
 
Figure 21: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Czech koruna. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 23: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Estonian kroon. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 24: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Hungarian forint. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 25: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Latvian lat. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 26: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Lithuanian lita. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 27: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Maltese lira. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 28: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Polish zloty. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 29: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Slovak koruna. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 30: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Slovenian tolar. Bands of ±1% 
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Figure 31: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Cyprus pound. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 32: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Czech koruna. Bands of ±2%  
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Figure 33: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Estonian kroon. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 34: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Hungarian forint. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 35: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Latvian lat. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 36: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Lithuanian lita. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 37: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Maltese lira. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 38: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Polish zloty. Bands of ±2% 
0
4
8
12
16
20
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Average variations Critical region
 
Figure 39: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Slovak koruna. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 40: Test of the average monthly variations for the 
Slovenian tolar Bands of ±2% 
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Table 1  
Probability of a peg in Cyprus 
 Coefficient t-Student 
Constant -3.7476 -4.7879 
Past inflation rate 14.2883 3.5784 
Past unemployment rate -1.0186 -4.5007 
LR statistic (2 df) 28.7991  
McFadden R-squared 0.3855  
Notes:  
a. The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero. McFadden R-
squared is the likelihood ratio index. 
b. In accordance with our methods of computing the implicit 
bands, both past inflation and unemployment rates are 
computed as the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-
four months. 
Table 2 
Probability of a peg in the Czech Republic 
 Coefficient t-Student 
Constant 44.4550 3.7525 
Past inflation rate 59.0078 3.7421 
Past unemployment rate -4.8109 -3.7690 
LR statistic (2 df) 41.4184  
McFadden R-squared 0.4795  
Notes:  
c. The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero. McFadden R-
squared is the likelihood ratio index. 
d. In accordance with our methods of computing the implicit 
bands, both past inflation and unemployment rates are 
computed as the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-
four months. 
Table 3 
Probability of a peg in Hungary 
 Coefficient t-Student 
Constant 3.2639 3.9334 
Past inflation rate 5.5808 3.1155 
Past unemployment rate -3.1994 -3.8011 
LR statistic (2 df) 9.5990  
McFadden R-squared 0.6834  
Notes:  
e. The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero. McFadden R-
squared is the likelihood ratio index. 
f. In accordance with our methods of computing the implicit 
bands, both past inflation and unemployment rates are 
computed as the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-
four months. 
Table 4 
Probability of a peg in Latvia 
 Coefficient t-Student 
Constant 4.6481 3.6253 
Past inflation rate 7.8529 3.7353 
Past unemployment rate -4.0812 -3.7025 
LR statistic (2 df) 13.2982  
McFadden R-squared 0.3423  
Notes:  
g. The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero. McFadden R-
squared is the likelihood ratio index. 
h. In accordance with our methods of computing the implicit 
bands, both past inflation and unemployment rates are 
computed as the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-
four months. 
 
Table 5 
Probability of a peg in Lithuania 
 Coefficient t-Student 
Constant 0.6008 3.4822 
Past inflation rate 8.3234 3.8816 
Past unemployment rate -2.4414 -3.1040 
LR statistic (2 df) 46.3815  
McFadden R-squared 0.4562  
Notes:  
i. The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero. McFadden R-
squared is the likelihood ratio index. 
j. In accordance with our methods of computing the implicit 
bands, both past inflation and unemployment rates are 
computed as the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-
four months. 
Table 6 
Probability of a peg in Malta 
 Coefficient t-Student 
Constant -7.0312 4.5162 
Past inflation rate 7.7689 3.1706 
Past unemployment rate -3.1359 -3.6338 
LR statistic (2 df) 45.4401  
McFadden R-squared 0.4712  
Notes:  
k. The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero. McFadden R-
squared is the likelihood ratio index. 
l. In accordance with our methods of computing the implicit 
bands, both past inflation and unemployment rates are 
computed as the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-
four months. 
Table 7 
Probability of a peg in Poland 
 Coefficient t-Student 
Constant 9.1895 4.3979 
Past inflation rate 5.4419 3.6794 
Past unemployment rate -3.8557 -4.7510 
LR statistic (2 df) 50.7758  
McFadden R-squared 0.4279  
Notes:  
m. The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope 
coefficients except the constant are zero. McFadden R-
squared is the likelihood ratio index. 
n. In accordance with our methods of computing the implicit 
bands, both past inflation and unemployment rates are 
computed as the rolling average rate for the previous twenty-
four months. 
 
 
